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Inflation and Welfare in Long-Run Equilibrium with Firm Dynamics
* 
 
We analyze the welfare cost of inflation in a model with cash-in-advance constraints and an 
endogenous distribution of establishments’ productivities. Inflation distorts aggregate 
productivity through firm entry dynamics. The model is calibrated to the United States 
economy and the long-run equilibrium properties are compared at low and high inflation. We 
find that, when the period over which the cash-in-advance constraint is binding is one 
quarter, an annual inflation rate of 10 percent leads to a decrease in the steady-state 
average productivity of roughly 0.5 percent compared to the optimum's steady-state. This 
decrease in productivity is not innocuous: it leads to a doubling of the welfare cost of inflation. 
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Whether the adoption of monetary policy rules that reduce ination and interest rates leads
to important welfare gains is a central question in monetary economics.1 Calculations often
suggest that the eects of changes in the ination rate on capital accumulation are modest.
However, if international dierences in income per capita are explained by dierences in the
accumulation of productive factors and by dierences in the eciency in the employment of
these factors, then the welfare cost of ination will be high if it discourages the accumulation
of factors of production or if it leads to less eciency in their use.2 The rst possibility has
been extensively examined in the literature however the latter has been neglected. In this
paper we begin the exploration of this second possibility.
In an inuential paper, Cooley and Hansen (1989) provide estimates of the welfare costs
of ination within the framework of a neoclassical monetary economy where money is held
because of cash-in-advance constraints. At moderate ination rates, these models produce
relatively modest welfare costs; for example, Cooley and Hansen (1989) report that, in
steady-state, a 10 percent ination rate results in a welfare cost of about 0.4 percent of
income relative to an optimal monetary policy.
However, in these earlier models average productivity is exogenous and only the ac-
cumulation of factors of production matters to determine income. Gomme (1993), De
Gregorio (1993) and Jones and Manuelli (1995) extend the work on the eects of monetary
policy to models of endogenous growth and nd the welfare cost of ination to be either
of the same magnitude or an order of magnitude smaller. But their work assumes a single
representative rm and abstract from heterogeneity in production units. If, however, the
allocation of aggregate resources across uses is important in understanding cross-country
dierences in per capita incomes, then it is not only the level of factor accumulation that
matters, but also how these factors are allocated across heterogeneous production units.3
1See Lucas (2000).
2Indeed, the prevailing view in development accounting is that cross-country dierences in income per
capita are mostly explained by dierences in Total Factor Productivity. See King and Levine (1994),
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005).
3There is substantial evidence of the importance of capital and labor allocation across establishments as
a determinant of aggregate productivity. Studies document that about half of overall productivity growth
in U.S. manufacturing can be attributed to factor reallocation from low productivity to high productivity
2In this paper, we investigate what is the impact of higher rates of monetary growth on
the economy in a model where the productivity distribution of incumbent establishments
is endogenous. For this purpose, we consider establishment heterogeneity along the lines of
Hopenhayn (1992), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Melitz (2003) to explain the en-
dogenous selection of rms in the industry. We incorporate this framework into a monetary
economy characterized with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and investment
goods, and in addition we assume that liquidity constraints also apply to the creation of
new establishments. Thus, in the model individuals must use cash to create new business
start-ups. This assumption is supported by substantial evidence that nance constraints
are often binding constraints facing aspiring entrepreneurs.
For instance, in work using U.S. micro data, Evans and Leighton (1989) and Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) have argued formally that entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints.
Blanchower and Oswald (1998) present further evidence on the barriers to entrepreneur-
ship, this time based on the National Survey of the Self-Employed, which draws on infor-
mation from a random sample of approximately 12,000 adults interviewed in Britain in the
spring of 1987. Individuals who were recently self-employed were asked to name the main
source of nance used to set up their business. Out of the 243 respondents who were in
this special category, 42 percent reported that they used their own savings to set up the
business, 15 percent used money from family or friends, while only 17 percent took a bank
loan. When asked the question \What help would have been most useful to you in setting
up your business?" the most commonly recorded item { by the same group of individuals {
was assistance with money and nance (mentioned by a quarter of respondents).4 All this
evidence is consistent with binding cash-in-advance constraints for business start-ups and
suggests that whatever goods or services need to be purchased to create new businesses,
they are dicult to purchase trough credit.
establishments for dierent time periods. See for instance Baily et al. (1992), Bartelsman and Doms (2000)
and Foster et al. (2008), among others.
4Blanchower and Oswald provide another elucidating test of the nance-constraint hypothesis. The
test uses data on inheritances and gifts and their results show that individuals who have received money
through inheritances or gifts are more likely to run their own businesses. This nding suggests that some
sort of cash constraint is a binding constraint on the creation of new businesses. Similar evidence is reported
in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994).
3Our framework allows us to analyze the eect of long-run monetary growth on average
productivity. In addition to discouraging investment and labor supply, we nd that an
increase in the long-run rate of money growth increases the cost of creating new estab-
lishments. As a result, incumbent establishments' prots must increase so as to encourage
industry entry. This allows new establishments with low productivity to stay in the indus-
try leading to a reallocation of the factors of production toward less ecient establishments.
The adjustment in the size distribution of incumbents lowers the economy's average pro-
ductivity.
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and nd that an annual ination rate of 10
percent leads to a decrease in the steady-state average productivity of about 0:5 percent,
compared to the ecient steady-state. Furthermore, we estimate the welfare cost due to the
ination tax of 10 percent ination to be about 0:9 percent of aggregate consumption, using
a quarter for the period over which money must be held. As it turns out, roughly half of
the welfare cost of ination is associated with the fall in average productivity. We consider
several alternative calibrations to the benchmark economy, revealing the importance of the
assumptions made regarding the returns to scale and the dispersion of productivities across
establishments.
In work which is related to this paper, Wu and Zhang (2001) examine the eects of
anticipated ination in a framework characterized by monopolistic competition and a well
dened industry structure. In their paper, rms' mark-ups are aected by the rate of
ination. They nd that at higher rates of ination the number of rms is less and their size
is smaller. The resulting welfare cost of ination is larger than the conventional estimates.
In our paper, the welfare cost of ination is also higher than those obtained in conventional
models. Moreover, as their model, our model also predicts that the number of incumbent
establishments is lower at high rates of ination. However, in our paper markets are
competitive and the higher welfare cost is associated with the change in the productivity
distribution of incumbent establishments.
Given the abundance of empirical evidence indicating the importance of producers'
heterogeneity and selection-based productivity growth, it is hardly surprising that an inu-
ential literature has developed, which examines the reallocation eects of policy distortions.
In the article mentioned earlier, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) consider the eect on av-
erage productivity and welfare of employment protection in a setting characterized with
4rm entry and exit dynamics. They nd that a tax on job destruction results in a decrease
in average productivity of over 2 percent. In a related paper Veracierto (2001) extends
Hopenhayn and Rogerson's analysis of ring taxes by introducing a exible form of capital
and considering transition dynamics. Veracierto nds that ring taxes equal to one year
of wages have large long-run eects: they decrease steady-state output, capital, consump-
tion, and wages by 7.84 percent and steady-state employment by 6.62 percent. With the
purpose of studying the role of international trade, Melitz (2003) shows how aggregate
industry productivity growth caused by reallocations across heterogeneous establishments
contributes to additional welfare gains from trade liberalization.
The role of policy distortions in environments with industry dynamics has also inu-
enced the literature on development. For instance, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) consider
policy distortions that lead to reallocation of resources across heterogeneous rms. Their
aim is to examine whether policies that leave aggregate relative prices unchanged but distort
the prices faced by dierent producers can explain cross-country dierences in per capita
incomes. In their benchmark model they nd that the reallocation of resources implied
by such policies can lead to decreases in output and productivity in the range of 30 to 50
percent, even though the underlying range of available technologies across establishments
is the same in all policy congurations. Samaniego (2006) proposes a model of plant dy-
namics to analyze the eects of policies that aect establishments dierently depending on
the stage of their life-cycle, notably subsidies to failing plants. He nds that these subsidies
may increase aggregate productivity. Guner et al. (2008) nd that policies that distort
the size-distribution of incumbent establishments may lead to substantial output and pro-
ductivity falls. Finally, Alfaro et al. (2008) investigate, using plant-level data for several
countries, whether dierences in the allocation of resources across heterogeneous plants are
a signicant determinant of cross-country dierences in income per worker. They nd that
allowing for rm heterogeneity improves the model ability to explain dierences in produc-
tivity across countries. Our paper introduces rm heterogeneity and industry dynamics
into a monetary growth model and considers the distortions introduced by the ination
tax, when money holdings are required to create new establishments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the details
of our model and describe the stationary competitive equilibrium. In Section 3 we investi-
gate the qualitative eect of changes in the monetary growth rate on the endogenous real
5aggregates and the size distribution of productive establishments. Section 4 discusses the
procedure for calibrating our model and section 5 presents our model-based quantitative
ndings. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a cash-in-advance production economy, which exhibits establishment level
heterogeneity as studied by Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Es-
tablishments have access to a decreasing returns to scale technology, pay a xed cost to
remain in operation each period and are subject to entry and exit. In what follows we
rst describe the problem of the household confronted with a cash-in-advance constraint,
next we describe the production side in more detail and nally characterize the stationary
competitive equilibrium.
2.1 The household
There is an innitely-lived representative household with preferences over streams of con-





t (lnCt + AlnLt);
where Ct is consumption at date t, Lt is leisure and  2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
The representative agent is endowed with one unit of productive time each period. She
owns three types of assets: capital, cash, and production establishments. The period 0
endowment of each asset is strictly positive.
The timing of the household decision problem resembles the one in Stockman (1981).
The household enters period t with nominal money balances equal to mt 1 that are carried
over from the previous period and in addition receives a lump-sum transfer equal to gMt 1
(in nominal terms), where Mt is the per capita money supply in period t. Thus, the money
stock follows the law of motion
Mt = (1 + g)Mt 1:
Output has three purposes: (i) it can serve as a consumption good; (ii) as an investment
good which increases the stock of capital owned by the household; (iii) as a marketing good
6which has to be purchased in order to create new establishments and constitutes a sunk
cost. Households are required to use their previously acquired money balances to purchase
goods. Because we want to compare situations when the constraint applies to some types of
good but not to others, we introduce three parameters that we denote by i with i = c;k;h.
When c = 1 the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the consumption good, when k = 1
purchases of the investment good are constrained and when h = 1 the constraint applies
to the marketing good needed to create a new establishment. When i = 0 (i = c;k;h) the
constraint does not apply to the specic good and this good is said to be a credit good in
the Lucas and Stokey (1987) sense. Hence, the constraint reads as




where pt is the price level at time t,  is the quantity of marketing good that has to be
purchased to create each new establishment, Et is the mass of new establishments created
and Xt is investment, given by
Xt = Kt+1   (1   )Kt; (2)
where Kt is the capital stock.
The representative household must choose consumption, investment, leisure, nominal
money holdings and the mass of new establishments subject to the cash-in-advance con-
straint (1) and the budget constraint
Ct + Xt + Et +
mt
pt
 wtNt + rtKt +  ztHt + (mt 1 + gMt 1)=pt; (3)
where Nt  (1   Lt) is time spent working and Ht is the mass of (incumbent) establishments
at time t; also, wt is the wage rate, rt the rate of return on capital and  zt are average
dividends across incumbent establishments.
We assume that the gross growth rate of money, 1 + g, always exceeds the discount
factor, , which is a sucient condition for (1) to always bind in equilibrium and existence
of a stationary equilibrium.5 We sometimes denote real money balances by t = mt
pt .
5It can be shown that the existence of a steady-state requires 1 + g  . See Abel (1985).
72.2 Production establishments
Once a new establishment is created at t, its idiosyncratic productivity s 2 S is revealed
as drawn from a distribution F(s) and remains constant over time until the establishment
exits the industry. At t+1 the establishment starts production. Incumbent establishments
produce output by renting labor and capital. The production function of an establishment





s;t   ; (4)
where ns;t and ks;t are labor and capital employed,  is a xed operating cost,  2 (0;1),








s;t   wtns;t   rtks;t   
	
; (5)
where wt is the wage rate and rt is the return on capital.
Establishments exit both because of exogenous exit shocks and endogenous decisions.
In particular, in any given period after production takes place, each establishment faces a
constant probability of death equal to . Moreover, an establishment decides to leave the
industry if its discounted prots are negative. Given that we only analyze the stationary
equilibrium of the economy and idiosyncratic productivities are constant over time, it turns
out that the only moment when an establishment decides to leave the industry is upon entry.
This is because prots are constant over time in the stationary equilibrium. Consequently,
establishments choose to exit when
zs < 0:
We denote by s? the idiosyncratic productivity threshold below which establishments choose
to exit. Specically, s? is such that zs? = 0.
Given the rst order conditions which solve the problem of incumbent rms (5) the































 =    (1 )   (1 ).
Let h(s;t) denote the mass of incumbent establishments with productivity level s at
time t. The motion equation for h(s;t) is given by
h(s;t + 1) = (1   )h(s;t) + EtdF(s)I[s  s
?
t]; (9)
where I is an indicator function that takes value one if the expression in brackets is true and
zero otherwise. With Ht =
R
s2S h(s;t)ds denoting the mass of incumbent establishments.
Consequently, the mass of entrants reads
Et =
Ht+1   (1   )Ht
1   F (s?
t)
: (10)
2.3 Household optimal behavior
The Bellman equation characterizing household's optimal behavior reads as
V (mt 1;Kt;Ht) = max
Ct;Lt;mt;Kt+1;Ht+1
flnCt + AlnLt + V (mt;Kt+1;Ht+1)g; (11)
and is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (1) and the budget constraint (3).
Let t and t be the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the constraints (1) and (3), respectively.




  ct   t = 0; (12)
A
Lt










(ht + t) = 0; (16)
9plus the budget constraint and the complementary slackness condition associated with the
budget constraint. Moreover, by the envelope theorem, the shadow values of money, capital











(ht + t) + t zt: (19)




















Equations (12) and (20)-(22), combined with the intra-temporal rst-order condition
(13) and the budget constraint (3) characterize the solution to the household problem.
2.4 Market clearing










Market clearing in the money market requires
mt = Mt: (25)
Finally, the economy's feasibility constraint reads





We consider the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model. In a steady-state
equilibrium, all rental rates and real aggregates are constant over time. Moreover, the
gross rate of ination  
pt+1
pt is also constant, equal to the gross rate of monetary growth
1 + g. Thus, we henceforth ignore all time subscripts to simplify the notation. Following










Hence, with knowledge of s? one can identify average productivity,  s. From equation (8),










wr   : (28)
We now illustrate three eects of ination related to the three cash-in-advance con-
straints of the economy.
Since the shadow values  and  are each positive and constant in the steady-state,6















Equation (29) suggests that, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to consumption,
an increase in ination raises the cost of consumption relative to leisure. This result corre-
sponds to the eect examined in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
Given equations (20) and (21), the representative household problem yields the station-














Equation (30) shows that the rental cost of capital is increasing in the rate of anticipated
ination when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the investment good. It also sug-
gests the following mechanism. When the cash-in-advance constraint applies to investment,
ination increases the cost of holding money balances, which reduces capital accumulation.
6See Stockman (1981).





As a result, at higher ination, the rental cost of capital is higher. This result is due to
Stockman (1981).









= [1   F(s
?)]
 z
1   (1   )
: (31)
Equation (31) states that in equilibrium the sunk cost that has to be paid to create a
new establishment (the left-hand side of (31)) has to be equal to the expected discounted
prots from creating this establishment (the right-hand side of (31)). The rate of discount
of prots depends on the household discount factor  and the probability  that the new
establishment dies in future periods. The probability [1   F(s?)] also appears on the right-
hand side of (31) because one has to account for the probability of successful entry when
evaluating discounted prots.
Equation (31) characterizes the mechanism by which money growth aects the estab-
lishments entry decision. When the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing
good, an increase in ination makes entry more costly. The next Section shows that this
has an eect on average productivity too.
Hence, ination may have three eects, depending on the structure of the cash-in-
advance constraint. It may aect labor supply, capital accumulation and the productivity
12distribution of incumbent establishments. Each eect contributes to lowering the level of
output. This allows us, in the next Section, to state a Proposition on the real eects
of ination. Before doing this, we go through the remaining relations characterizing the
equilibrium.
In the stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal exit rule by incumbent estab-











Since the equilibrium interest rate is determined by (30), the exit condition characterizes a
relation between the wage rate and the productivity threshold which is represented by the
SS locus in Figure 1.
In turn, the expected value of entry, i.e. the right-hand side of the free-entry condi-
tion (31) is locally independent of s? by the envelope theorem (see Appendix A for proof).
Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate is independent of s?, as illustrated by the WW
locus in Figure 1. Hence, in an equilibrium with production the free-entry condition deter-
mines the wage rate.







which, combined with the resource constraint (26), gives a solution for the mass of incum-
bent establishments, completing the characterization of the stationary competitive equilib-
rium. Specically, the stationary competitive equilibrium is dened as follows:7
Denition 1. A stationary competitive equilibrium is a wage rate, w, a rental rate of cap-
ital, r, an aggregate distribution of establishments, h(s), a mass of entry, E, a household
value function, V (m;K;H), an establishment prot function, zs, a productivity thresh-
old, s?, policy functions for incumbent establishments, ns and ks, and aggregate levels of
consumption, C, employment, N, capital, K and real money balances, , such that:
i. The household optimizes: equations (11), (29), (30) and (31);
ii. Establishments optimize: equations (6), (7), (8) and (32);
7It is shown in the appendix B that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
13iii. Markets clear: equations (23), (24), (25) and (26);
iv. h(s) is an invariant distribution, i.e. a xed point of (9).
To summarize, the model is solved as follows. First, the rental cost of capital is pinned
down by equation (30). Then, given the value of r, one can solve for the values of the
wage rate, w, and the productivity threshold, s?, from (31) and (32). One can conse-
quently characterize fully the stationary distribution of capital, employment, prots and
output with equations (4), (6), (7) and (8) across incumbent rms. Finally, the feasibil-
ity constraint (26), together with the other market-clearing conditions and the rst-order
condition for leisure (29), allow to determine the mass of incumbents, H, and all the ag-
gregates of the economy such as investment, consumption, output, the stock of capital and
employment.8
3 The real eects of ination
We now investigate the relation between ination, the equilibrium aggregates K and N,
and the size distribution of productive establishments, characterized by s?. Proposition 1
summarizes our main result
PROPOSITION 1. Consider the stationary competitive equilibrium as dened earlier.
i. If c = k = h = 0, an increase in the ination rate, , has no eect on the economy.
ii. If c = 1 and k = h = 0, an increase in the ination rate, , is associated with a fall
in the equilibrium capital stock, K, and a fall in the employment rate, N. However,
the productivity threshold, s?, does not change.
iii. If k = 1 and c = h = 0, an increase in the ination rate, , is associated with a fall
in the equilibrium capital stock, K, and a fall in the employment rate, N. However,
the productivity threshold, s?, does not change.
8In the Appendix E, we present all the equations that characterize the stationary equilibrium for the
particular restriction that we impose on the distribution F. See also Section 4, where we describe the
calibration procedure.
14Figure 2: Eect of an increase in the monetary growth rate g on s? and w when k = 1








iv. If h = 1 and c = k = 0, an increase in the ination rate, , is associated with a
fall in the equilibrium capital stock, K, a fall in the employment rate, N, and a fall
in the productivity threshold, s?.
In what follows we discuss some aspect related to Proposition 1, however, the detailed
proof is developed in the Appendix D. When i = 0 for all i, all goods are credit goods and
therefore money growth has no real eects. When consumption is a cash good condition (29)
is aected by money growth. At high rates of ination, the marginal utility of leisure must
fall with respect to the product of the wage rate and the marginal utility of consumption,
leading the household to supply less labor. Lower hours worked leads to lower output
and therefore lower consumption and capital stock. The rental cost of capital, determined
by (30), remains the same and, therefore both the SS relation and the WW relation, in
Figure 1, are unaected. Thus the wage rate and average productivity are unaected.
When k = 1 { thus, investment is a cash good { condition (30) is aected. At high
rates of ination the return on capital must increase as individuals are less willing to
invest. The increase in the rental cost of capital lowers prots for the same wage rate and
therefore the probability of a successful entry decreases at each wage rate (i.e. the SS
locus in Figure 2 shifts upward). However, the probability of successful entry must remain
15Figure 3: Eect of an increase in the monetary growth rate g on s? and w when h = 1
and k = 0
s* WW 0 SS WW 1 w
unchanged in equilibrium since the cost of creating a new establishment (the left-hand side
of equation (31)) has not changed. Thus, for there to be an equilibrium with entry, the
wage rate must fall suciently for the free entry condition to be satised. The WW locus
in Figure 1 shifts left. At high rates of ination the wage rate is lower but the productivity
threshold is unaected, as illustrated by Figure 2.
When the marketing good is a cash good, h = 1, the cash-in-advance constraint in-
creases the cost of creating new establishments and the comparative static is the same as
the one corresponding to an increase in the sunk cost, illustrated in Figure 3. In particular,
consider the comparative statics of moving from a stationary equilibrium with a low rate
of monetary growth to an equilibrium with a high rate of monetary growth. For there to
be an equilibrium with entry, rms' expected value of entry must increase. Since the rental
cost of capital remains unchanged, rms are not willing to enter the industry unless the
wage rate falls. Accordingly the WW locus has to shift to the left which translates into a
movement along the SS curve. This in turn leads to a lower productivity threshold.
164 Calibration
In this section we describe the model calibration procedure. Since we consider dierent
model specications { corresponding to dierent values for i, i = c;k;h { the calibration
of some parameters changes across specication. When this happens, we report the values
taken by the parameters for each specication (see Table 1).
In order to solve our model we need to specify a distribution for the establishments'
productivity draws F(s). Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume a Pareto distribu-





shape parameter is an index of the dispersion of productivity draws: dispersion decreases
as " increases, and the productivity draws are increasingly concentrated toward the lower
bound s0. This assumption has two advantages: it generates a distribution of idiosyn-
cratic productivities among incumbent establishments that ts microeconomic data quite
well9 and delivers close-form solutions for the endogenous aggregates.10 Specically, the
distribution of productivities among incumbent establishments, which is the distribution
F left-truncated at s?, is also Pareto with lower bound s? and shape parameter ".
Parameter values are selected so that the steady-state of the model economy reproduces
several important features of U.S. data. Furthermore, we assume that the length of time
that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding is one quarter and calibrate the model ac-
cordingly. The growth rate of the money supply, g, is chosen to be 0:006, corresponding
to an annual rate of ination of 2:43 percent, which matches the average annual rate of
ination in the U.S. between 1988 and 2007, reported in the World Economic Indicators.
For the labor and capital income shares,  and  respectively, empirical evidence con-
cerning establishment level returns to scale, reported by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) suggests
the relation + = 0:85. In particular, these authors consider this choice to be consistent
with the evidence in Atkenson et al. (1996). The separate identication of  and  is done
by setting the labor income share to be 64 percent,  = 0:64, as is standard in the real
business cycle literature.
The depreciation rate is chosen on the basis of estimated depreciation by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Thus, we set  = 0:0160, implying an annual depreciation rate
9See Axtell (2001) and Cabral and Mata (2003).
10See the Appendix E for the complete description of the model solution.
17Table 1: Parameters: summary
Notation Parameter Value
g Monetary growth rate 0.0060
 Labor income share 0.6400
 Capital income share 0.2100
 Depreciation rate of capital 0.0160
 Household's discount factor
Model specications for which:
k = 0 0.9902
k = 1 0.9906
" Pareto distribution shape parameter 7.2655
 Failure rate of incumbent establishments 0.0179
s0 Pareto distribution lower bound 1.0000
 Sunk entry cost 1.0000
 Fixed operating cost
Model specications for which:
k = 1 and h = 1 0.9063
k = 0 and h = 1 0.9035
k = 1 and h = 0 0.9092
k = 0 and h = 0 0.9065
A Disutility of labor
Model specications for which:
c = 1 k = 1 and h = 1 2.3939
c = 1 k = 0 and h = 1 2.3889
c = 0 k = 1 and h = 1 2.4311
c = 0 k = 0 and h = 1 2.4270
c = 1 k = 1 and h = 0 2.3982
c = 1 k = 0 and h = 0 2.3932
c = 0 k = 1 and h = 0 2.4354
c = 0 k = 0 and h = 0 2.4314
Note: The calibration of ,  and A varies according to the model specication and, in particular, according to the value taken by c, k and
c. Thus, we report the values taken by the parameters by ,  and A, for each specication.
of 6.54 percent. Given the depreciation rate, the rental cost of capital r is chosen so that
the annual real interest rate is 4 percent. The implied value for the rental cost of capital,
r is 0:03. In turn, this implies  = 0:9906 when investment is a cash good, k = 1, and
 = 0:9902 when investment is a credit good, k = 0.
The parameter measuring the disutility of labor, A, is chosen so that individuals spend
25:5 percent of their endowment of time working, based on Gomme and Rupert (2007),
who interpret evidence from the American Time-use Survey. Depending on the model
specication, this yields a value for A ranging between 2:3889 and 2:4354.
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we choose the shape parameter of the productivity
draws' distribution in order to match the standard deviation of log U.S. plant sales, which
18Table 2: Calibration: targets
Target Value
U.S. average annual ination rate (1988-2007) 0.0243
Production function returns to scale 0.85
Labor income share 0.64
Annual real interest rate 0.04
Annual depreciation rate of capital 0.0654
Standard deviation of log U.S. plant sales 1.67
Manufacturing establishments (6 { 10 years old) failure rates 0.303
Average establishment size (number of employees) 62
Fraction of time spent working (rate) 0.255
Note: The parameters s0 and  are normalized to 1.
in our case is also output and is reported to be 1:67 in Bernard et al. (2003). Since in our
model, this standard deviation is 1
" , this implies that the value for " is 7:2655.
The establishments death rate  is chosen based on empirical evidence reported in
Dunne et al. (1989). These authors perform an empirical investigation of establishment
turnover using data on plants that rst began operating in the 1967, 1972, or 1977 Census
of Manufacturers, a rich source of information concerning the U.S. manufacturing sector.
They report ve-year exit rates among plants aged 1{5 year old (39.7 percent), 6{11 year
old (30.3 percent) and older (25.5 percent). As expected, plant failure rates decline with
age. We choose to calibrate the exit rate of incumbent establishments by matching the exit
rate of 6{11 year old rms. This yields a value for  of 0.0179, implying that each quarter
1.79 percent of incumbent establishments exit the industry.
The remaining parameters to be calibrated are s0,  and . Notice rst that s0 can
be normalized to 1 without loss of generality because it has no impact on the endogenous
exit-decision of new establishments. Moreover, only the ratio

 is identiable and, hence,
we normalize the sunk cost, , to 1 and solve for the resulting xed operating cost .
The statistic used to determine  is the establishments' average employment. In particu-
lar, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), using data from the Manufacturing Establishments
Longitudinal Research Panel, report the average number of employees in manufacturing
establishments to be about 62 employees. Since, as reported above, individuals spend 25.5
19percent of their endowment of time working, this implies that the average establishment
employment in units of time is 15.81. The resulting value of the xed operating cost 
ranges between 0.9035 and 0.9092, depending on the model specication.
This completes the calibration description. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values
and Table 2 the targets informing our choices.
5 Results
The Friedman rule, that is, deating the economy at the rate of time preference is optimal
in this economy.11 We use the model economy just described to contrast the ecient
steady-state to the long-run equilibria associated with alternative monetary policy rules. In
particular, we describe how the macroeconomic aggregates, including output, consumption,
investment and aggregate hours as well as the number of incumbent establishments and
average productivity vary with respect to the Pareto optimal allocation, at various rates
of monetary growth. We then use the model to measure the welfare costs of anticipated
ination under alternative model specications. Finally, we examine the role played by
rm heterogeneity in explaining our ndings.
5.1 Steady-state properties
We choose as the benchmark monetary growth rate, g =    1, which is the policy rule
yielding the Pareto optimal allocation. Accordingly, Tables 3 and 4 report the level of
each macroeconomic aggregate of interest and of average productivity relative to the levels
corresponding to the Pareto optimal steady-state. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, anticipated
ination has a signicant impact on the long-run equilibrium of the economy. Steady-state
output, consumption, investment, hours and the number of establishments in the economy
are all lower whenever the monetary growth rate exceeds    1. We begin by interpreting
the results in each table.
Table 3 corresponds to model specications where h = 1 and, hence, the marketing
good is a cash good. The Table includes four Panels, each corresponding to an alterna-
tive conguration of the cash-in-advance constraint. When the cash-in-advance constraint
11We show this is the case in Appendix C.
20Table 3: Steady-states associated with various annual monetary growth rates relative to
the benchmark when the marketing good is a cash good, i.e.: h = 1
Panel A: c = 1 and k = 1 Panel B: c = 1 and k = 0
Annual Ination 100 100
Rate in % (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00 (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00
Output 100.00 98.60 97.71 95.14 93.56 100.00 98.98 98.36 96.55 95.43
Consumption 100.00 98.87 98.15 96.04 94.74 100.00 99.09 98.54 96.92 95.91
Investment 100.00 97.67 96.22 92.03 89.50 100.00 98.98 98.36 96.55 95.43
Hours 100.00 99.10 98.54 96.87 95.84 100.00 99.19 98.70 97.25 96.35
# Establishments 100.00 98.60 97.71 95.14 93.56 100.00 98.98 98.36 96.55 95.43
Productivity 100.00 99.87 99.79 99.54 99.39 100.00 99.87 99.78 99.54 99.39
Panel C: c = 0 and k = 1 Panel D: c = 0 and k = 0
Annual Ination 100 100
Rate in % (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00 (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00
Output 100.00 99.29 98.84 97.52 96.71 100.00 99.71 99.53 99.00 98.67
Consumption 100.00 99.56 99.28 98.45 97.93 100.00 99.82 99.71 99.38 99.17
Investment 100.00 98.36 97.33 94.33 92.52 100.00 99.71 99.53 99.00 98.67
Hours 100.00 99.80 99.67 99.30 99.07 100.00 99.92 99.87 99.72 99.63
# Establishments 100.00 99.29 98.84 97.52 96.71 100.00 99.71 99.53 99.00 98.67
Productivity 100.00 99.87 99.79 99.54 99.39 100.00 99.87 99.78 99.54 99.39
Notes: * average U.S. ination rate over the 1988-2007 period. The steady-states levels are reported in percentage points relative to the model
which corresponds to the economy where the monetary growth rate is g =    1.
applies to the creation of new establishments, the size distribution of productive establish-
ments moves toward lower productivity levels at higher monetary growth rates. Hence, the
average productivity of incumbent establishments is lower at high rates of ination. The
bottom row of each Panel of Table 3 reports the level of average productivity at various
rates of money growth. Inspecting each panel reveals that the money growth rule aects
productivity in the same way for each possible conguration of the cash-in-advance con-
straint as long as h = 1. When the annual rate of ination is 10 percent, productivity,
relative to the optimum, is 0:46 percent lower. Thus, increasing the monetary growth rate
has a negative impact on average productivity which results directly from the fact that
money holdings are a requirement for the creation of new establishments.
The results regarding the other macroeconomic aggregates are of course sensitive to
the model specication. Examining Panel B of both Table 3 and Table 4 illustrates the
implications of anticipated ination when consumption is a cash good. Agents facing high
rates of ination substitute away from consumption and toward leisure which leads to
lower output and therefore lower consumption and investment. Moreover, Panel B of
Table 4 reveals that, even when the liquidity constraint only applies to the consumption
21Table 4: Steady-states associated with various annual monetary growth rates relative to
the benchmark when the marketing good is a credit good, i.e.: h = 0
Panel A: c = 1 and k = 1 Panel B: c = 1 and k = 0
Annual Ination 100 100
Rate in % (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00 (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00
Output 100.00 98.88 98.17 96.09 94.82 100.00 99.27 98.83 97.52 96.72
Consumption 100.00 99.04 98.43 96.63 95.53 100.00 99.27 98.83 97.52 96.72
Investment 100.00 97.95 96.67 92.95 90.70 100.00 99.27 98.83 97.52 96.72
Hours 100.00 99.18 98.67 97.15 96.21 100.00 99.27 98.83 97.52 96.72
# Establishments 100.00 98.88 98.17 96.09 94.82 100.00 99.27 98.83 97.52 96.72
Productivity 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel C: c = 0 and k = 1 Panel D: c = 0 and k = 0
Annual Ination 100 100
Rate in % (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00 (4   1) 0.00 2.43* 10.00 15.00
Output 100.00 99.57 99.30 98.50 98.01 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Consumption 100.00 99.73 99.56 99.06 98.74 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Investment 100.00 98.64 97.78 95.28 93.76 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Hours 100.00 99.88 99.80 99.58 99.45 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
# Establishments 100.00 99.57 99.30 98.50 98.01 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Productivity 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: * average U.S. ination rate over the 1988-2007 period. The steady-states levels are reported in percentage points relative to the model
which corresponds to the economy where the monetary growth rate is g =    1.
good, still output and investment both fall proportionally, preserving the investment-output
ratio, despite the fact that the investment good and the marketing good are credit goods.
This result follows from the fact that the purpose of increasing the capital stock is to
provide consumption in the future, which is aected by the ination tax in the same way
as consumption today.
Another implication of our model economy is that the amount of time spent working
is lower at higher rates of ination, implying an upward slopping long-run Phillips curve.
This nding is robust across model specications.
Also, both Table 3 and Table 4 show that as the monetary growth rate is increased, the
number of incumbent establishments and equivalently the creation of new establishments
lower substantially. There are two reasons why less establishments enter at high rates of
ination. First, since the purpose of creating new establishments is to produce consumption
in the future, which is subject to exactly the same ination tax as consumption today, the
creation of new establishments is discouraged at high rates of ination. This happens
even when the marketing good is a credit good { Table 4. The second reason, which only
intervenes when the marketing good is a cash good { Table 3 { has to do with the fact that
22the cost of creating new establishments increases as the monetary growth rate is raised.
As the cost of creating new establishments is increased, the prots of incumbents must
increase as well, which allows low productivity establishments to stay in the industry. This
adjustment in the size distribution of productive establishments implies that labor and
capital are employed less eciently, which lowers aggregate output and, consequently, the
creation of new establishments.
Finally, Panel D in Table 4 simply illustrates that the cash-in-advance constraints are
the only channel through which the economy is aected by changes in the rate of growth
of money. In what follows, we investigate the welfare cost of ination and we study more
carefully the role played by rm heterogeneity.
5.2 Welfare costs of ination
To obtain a measure of the welfare cost associated with ination we proceed in the same
way as in Cooley and Hansen (1989). In particular, we compute the increase in steady-state
consumption which an individual would require at a given rate of money growth, g, to be
as well-o as under the optimal monetary policy rule, which achieves the Pareto optimal
allocation. Thus, to compute the welfare cost associated with variations in the monetary
growth rate, we solve for W  C
C in the equation
b U = ln[(1 + W)C] + Aln(1   N); (34)
where b U is the level of utility attained in steady-state under the optimal monetary policy
rule, g =   1, and C and N are the steady-state consumption and hours associated with
the monetary growth rate g.



































where ^ s? and b N are, respectively, the productivity threshold and the fraction of time spent
working under the Pareto optimal allocation and s? and N are the equivalent outcomes
12The solution for the welfare cost of ination is derived in Section F of the Appendix.
23Table 5: Welfare costs associated with various annual growth rates of money
h = 1 h = 0
c = 1 c = 1 c = 0 c = 0 c = 1 c = 1 c = 0 c = 0
100 g k = 1 k = 0 k = 1 k = 0 k = 1 k = 0 k = 1 k = 0
100 (4   1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.00 0.393 0.239 0.274 0.113 0.286 0.125 0.168 0.000
2.43* 0.651 0.389 0.451 0.182 0.474 0.205 0.276 0.000
10.00 1.451 0.857 0.986 0.391 1.057 0.456 0.601 0.000
15.00 1.975 1.165 1.326 0.524 1.439 0.624 0.807 0.000
20.00 2.495 1.470 1.658 0.652 1.818 0.791 1.007 0.000
40.00 4.527 2.669 2.901 1.129 3.300 1.462 1.752 0.000
Notes: * average U.S. ination rate over the 1988-2007 period. The measure of the welfare cost of ination is C=C  100 where C is the
consumption compensation needed for the representative agent to achieve the same steady-state utility associated with the optimal monetary
policy rule.
under the alternative monetary growth rate. Equation (35) illustrates the various channels
through which anticipated ination aects welfare. Term (i) illustrates how anticipated
ination lowers welfare when consumption is a cash good. Term (ii) illustrates how antic-
ipated ination lowers welfare when investment is a cash good. Term (iii) illustrates how
welfare is aected by changes in the threshold productivity, s?. If the marketing good is
a cash good the productivity threshold falls as the monetary growth rate increases and
the cost of anticipated ination is amplied. Finally, term (iv) shows the contribution of
leisure.13
Table 5 shows our ndings. The left-hand side Panel corresponds to the specications
where the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the entry sunk cost and the right-hand side
Panel considers the other cases. When the cash-in-advance constraint does not apply to
the sunk cost the welfare costs of ination we obtain are of the same order of magnitude as
the ones obtained by Cooley and Hansen (1989). In particular, when only consumption is
a cash good { the specication which corresponds more closely to the Cooley and Hansen
model { the welfare cost of a 10 percent rate of ination is 0:46 percent of steady-state
consumption. This is roughly the same cost which is reported in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
However, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing good, the wel-
fare costs of ination is almost doubled. For example, the welfare cost of a 10 percent rate
of ination when the consumption and marketing goods are cash goods is 0:86 percent of
13As each cash-in-advance constraint contributes to increase leisure as the monetary growth rate is
increased { implying, b N > N { term (iv) lowers the cost of anticipated ination.
24steady state consumption. A substantial part of the welfare losses at high rates of ina-
tion are explained by the lower eciency in the allocation of resources across incumbent
establishments and not just by less accumulation of factors of production. Contrasting the
second row of the left-hand side panel and the second row of the right-hand side panel shows
that when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the creation of new establishments the
welfare cost of ination nearly doubles.
If all three goods are cash goods, the welfare cost of 10 percent ination is 1:45 percent
of steady-state consumption. Thus, the cost of ination resulting from lower investment
and time spent working can be substantially amplied by the fall in the wage rate implied
by the distortion to the establishments' entry and exit dynamics. Finally, if money only
aects rm entry and exit dynamics { when the marketing good is the only cash good {
the welfare cost of 10 percent ination is 0:39 percent of steady-state consumption.
5.3 The role of returns to scale
Atkeson et al. (1996) forcefully show that the choice of the returns to scale in models with
industry dynamics is an important determinant of the size of the eect of policy distortions
on average productivity and welfare.14 Therefore, in this section we consider how sensitive
our estimates of the welfare costs of ination are to changes in the returns to scale. As
expected, as  +  approaches one, productivity is no longer aected by changes in the
monetary growth rate and the contribution of factors reallocation to the welfare cost of
ination disappears. However, this contribution increases at a high rate, as the intensity
of diminishing returns increases.
Table 6 shows the average productivity associated with dierent degrees of diminishing
returns to scale and the corresponding welfare cost of ination. For each model specication
consumption is a cash good but investment is a credit good { Cooley and Hansen's (1989)
specication. This allows us to understand the role of productivity in explaining the welfare
cost of ination for dierent degrees of diminishing returns. Once again, we consider the
welfare cost of 10 percent ination.
14Moreover, it should be noted that Atkeson et al. (1996) present evidence against the hypothesis that
plant production or prot functions are nearly linear. This oers support to the view that policy distortions
have sizable eects.
25Table 6: Welfare costs corresponding to dierent degrees of diminishing returns to scale
h = 0 h = 1 Share of welfare cost
 +  100   s
 s 100  W 100  W explained by fall in  s
0.75 -0.73 0.43 1.05 0.59
0.80 -0.60 0.44 0.96 0.54
0.85 -0.46 0.46 0.86 0.47
0.90 -0.32 0.47 0.74 0.37
0.95 -0.16 0.47 0.62 0.23
0.99 -0.03 0.48 0.51 0.06
Note: The measure of the welfare cost of ination is W, the percentage increase in consumption required to for the representative agent to
achieve the same steady-state utility associated with the Pareto optimum allocation, when the annual ination rate is 10 percent. For each
model specication consumption is a cash good { c = 1 { and investment is a credit good { k = 0.
Naturally, when the returns to scale are nearly constant, + = 0:99, the productivity is
almost not aected as the monetary growth rate is increased. Indeed, average productivity
is only 0:03 percent lower at 10 percent ination, compared to the level under the optimal
policy. Hence, the welfare costs of ination are roughly the same, irrespectively of whether
the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing good or not. The last column
of Table 6 shows how distortions to the size distribution of productive establishments
contribute to the welfare costs of ination.15 As expected, when the returns to scale are
nearly constant this contribution is very small. However, the contribution increases fast,
as the intensity of diminishing returns increases. Indeed, for the range of  +  between
0:75 and 0:90, which is likely to include the empirically relevant values, the contribution of
distortions to the size distribution of incumbents is sizable, taking values between 37 and
59 percent of the total welfare cost of ination.
As the intensity of diminishing returns increases, the share of welfare cost explained by
a fall in average productivity increases (see the last column in Table 6). This happens for
two reasons. First, as returns diminish faster, the distortions to the size distribution of
establishments, resulting from the ination tax, are more important and lead to signicant
falls in average productivity. Thus, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the
marketing good, i.e. h = 1, the welfare cost of ination is high. However, an additional
15We quantify this by computing the percentage increase in the welfare cost of ination when the cash-
in-advance constraint applies to the sunk entry cost.
26Table 7: Welfare costs corresponding to dierent degrees of establishment heterogeneity
vol h = 0 h = 1 Share of welfare cost
 1
  100   s
 s 100  W 100  W explained by fall in  s
0.01 -0.03 0.33 0.35 0.07
0.50 -0.39 0.43 0.77 0.43
1.00 -0.44 0.45 0.83 0.46
1.67 -0.46 0.46 0.86 0.47
2.00 -0.47 0.46 0.87 0.47
5.00 -0.49 0.46 0.89 0.48
Note: The measure of the welfare cost of ination is W, the percentage increase in consumption required to for the representative agent to
achieve the same steady-state utility associated with the Pareto optimum allocation, when the annual ination rate is 10 percent. For each
model specication consumption is a cash good { c = 1 { and investment is a credit good { k = 0.
reason why the contribution of falls in average productivity to the welfare cost of ination
increases at lower values of  +  is that when the marketing good is a credit good, i.e.
h = 0, the welfare cost of ination increases as the intensity of diminishing returns to scale
decreases. This is because, when h = 0, the welfare cost is explained by the fall in the
accumulation of factors. Thus, when + is low, the falls in output and welfare associated
with the ination tax are less important.
Overall, for values of  +  between 0:75 and 0:90, the empirically relevant range, the
contribution of distortions to the size distribution of productive establishments is sub-
stantial and the welfare costs of 10 percent anticipated ination, when the cash-in-advance
constraint applies to the creation of new establishments, vary between 0:74 and 1:05 percent
of steady-state consumption.
5.4 The role of rm heterogeneity
When the marketing good is a cash good the level of heterogeneity turns into an important
determinant of the way changes in the monetary growth rate aect the economy: the larger
the heterogeneity, the larger is the fall in productivity. Here we investigate what happens
to the estimate of the welfare cost of ination as we change the level of rm heterogeneity.
Table 7 shows dierent welfare cost estimates as we vary the amount of establishment
heterogeneity, for two dierent models specications { when the marketing good is a credit
27good and when it is a cash good.16 As the dispersion of establishments' productivities
increases, the fall in productivity associated with an increase in the rate of ination, varies
from 0:03 percent to 0:49 percent. In particular, when there is almost no heterogeneity
( 1
  = 0:01), productivity is virtually not aected by the ination tax. Moreover, as the
level of heterogeneity falls to zero, productivity is not aected by changes in the monetary
growth rate and, accordingly, the welfare cost of anticipated ination is the same no matter
whether the marketing good is a cash good or a credit good. This illustrates clearly that
the mechanism proposed in this paper intervenes through the productivity channel.
Furthermore, we notice that as the level of heterogeneity increases toward empirically
relevant values, the sensitivity of productivity to the ination tax increases very fast. For
instance, if the standard deviation of log output is 0:50 (which is about one third of our
benchmark calibration), at a 10 percent monetary growth rate, productivity is lowered by
0:39 percent and the welfare cost of ination increases substantially. Therefore, we conclude
that our ndings are robust to changes in the variability of establishment productivity draws
over the empirically relevant range.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to investigate whether it is important to model heterogeneity across
productive establishments when quantifying the welfare cost of ination. For this purpose,
we study a model characterized with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and in-
vestment goods, and in addition we assume that cash-in-advance constraints also apply to
the creation of new establishments. This assumption is motivated by substantial evidence
that nance constraints are often binding constraints facing aspiring entrepreneurs.
Two results come out of our analysis. First, anticipated ination lowers aggregate
productivity. This happens because an increase in the long-run rate of money growth
increases the cost of creating new establishments and distorts rm entry dynamics. As a
consequence, incumbent establishments' prots must increase so as to encourage industry
entry, and less productive establishments choose to become incumbents, lowering average
productivity. This opens a channel through which ination may aect welfare which has
16Once again, for each model specication consumption is a cash goods but investment is a credit good {
Cooley and Hansen's (1989) specication.
28been paid little attention to in the literature. Second, the mechanism identied in the
current paper is likely to be quantitatively important. In particular, our results suggest that
the adjustment in the productivity distribution of incumbent establishments is responsible
for about half of the welfare cost of ination.
We have only examined the long-run benets of implementing an optimal monetary
policy associated with the reallocation of resources within an industry. The re-allocation of
these resources may also entail short-run costs which could undermine our estimates of the
welfare cost of ination. Future work should examine the benets of adopting an optimal
monetary policy taking into account the adjustment path.
As was mentioned earlier, Baily et al. (1992) document that about half of overall pro-
ductivity growth in U.S. manufacturing in the 1980's can be attributed to factor reallocation
from low productivity to high productivity establishments. It is tempting to imagine that
the sustained disination which occurred over the same period may have contributed to
the reallocation of factors and improvements in eciency.
29Appendix
A Locally vertical WW locus
The purpose of this section is to show that the WW locus is locally vertical. Hence,
equilibrium wage rate w and s? are independent. To do this, we apply the implicit func-
tion theorem to the relation (31) with the purpose of nding dw
ds?. First, notice that the
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a sucient and necessary condition for dw
ds? = 0 is simply
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@s? = 0. In turn
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because relation (32) implies that in equilibrium 
s?
wr = . Therefore dw
ds? = 0 and the
WW locus is locally vertical.
B Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
This Section contains a proof that the relations (31) and (32) always dene a unique
equilibrium17. The condition (31) implies a relation for average prots, given by








   1 + 
1   F (s?)
: (37)
In turn, combining the relations (28) and (32) implies that average prots must satisfy the
equilibrium condition given by







17A similar argument for proving existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this class of heterogeneous
rm models can be found in Melitz (2003).
30Consequently, a sucient condition for ensuring the existence and uniqueness of s? is
that























By applying the Chain and Leibniz rules, the derivative of (^ s) with respect to ^ s is found
to be

0 (^ s) =
f (^ s)
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 
(^ s) + 
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(40)
Thus, the derivative and elasticity of j (^ s) are given by
j
0 (^ s) =  

^ s
((^ s) + 1)[1   F (^ s)] < 0; (41)














be decreasing to zero as ^ s goes to innity. Moreover, lim^ s!0 j (^ s) = 1 since lim^ s!0 (^ s) =
1. Hence, j (^ s) is monotonically decreasing from innity to zero on (0;1) as needed to
be proved.
C Optimal monetary policy
Here we derive the optimal rate of ination. The proof relies on the observation that the
optimal ination rate corresponds to the case where the cash-in-advance constraint is not
binding. When the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier is zero, i.e. t = 0 for all t. To derive the optimal rate of ination we start by














Given that t is constant in the stationary equilibrium and positive (from equation (13)),
and the growth rate of money is equal to ination in that equilibrium, it follows that the
Friedman rule applies to the stationary equilibrium of our model, that is, the optimal rate
of ination is equal to (   1).
D Proof of Proposition 1
Following is a proof of Proposition 1. The case where all i's are zero is trivial. In the next
subsections, we analyze in more details the eect of anticipated ination when one of the
i's takes value one.
D.1 Case where c = 1, k = 0 and h = 0
We consider rst the case where c = 1, k = 0 and h = 0. Notice that in this context
ination does not aect the rental cost of capital in (30), nor the productivity threshold
and the wage rate in (31) and (32). From (4), (6), (7) and (8), this implies that average
output, employment, capital use and prots are also not aected by ination.
To determine the eect of ination on the other aggregates, notice that in the stationary
equilibrium X = K =  kH, E =  
1 F(s?)H and Y =  yH. Replace those equations and








i +  kH + 

1   F(s?)
H =  yH (45)
Given the labor-market clearing condition, we can write L = 1   N = 1    nH. Replacing



























Equation(46) shows that when c = 1, an increase in the anticipated rate of ination g
decreases the mass of incumbent rms H. Given that average employment, capital and
output are not aected, this implies that an increase in the anticipated rate of ination g
also decreases the aggregate level of capital, employment and output.
32D.2 Case where c = 0, k = 1 and h = 0
When k = 1, equation (30) shows that an increase in g increases the rental cost of capital
r.
To determine the eect of ination on the productivity threshold and the wage rate in










= [1   F(s
?)]









Hence, the productivity threshold does not depend on the rental cost of capital. Following
an increase in g, the negative eect of the increase in r on prots cancels out with the
positive eect of a decrease in wages. This latter can be seen from equations (30), (32)
and (47).
Regarding the eect of ination on average output per establishment, remark that, from
equations (4), (6) and (7), average output can be written as



















Hence ination does not aect average output.
To determine the impact on average capital and employment, notice from (6) and (7)
and the fact that the productivity threshold is not aected by ination that
dln  n =  (1   )dlnw   dlnr (50)
dln k =  dlnw   (1   )dlnr (51)
Given that
dlnw =  dlnr (52)
from equation (32) and the fact that s? is not aected by ination, this set of equations
can be rewritten as




dln k =  dlnr (54)
33Thus an increase in ination increases the average level of employment per establishment,
while it decreases average capital use.
Equation (46) is still valid if the cash-in-advance constraint only applies to investment.
Consequently, if ination increases average employment, decreases the wage rate and av-
erage capital and does not aect average output and the productivity threshold, then it
decreases the mass of incumbent establishments from equation (46). Hence, aggregate out-
put and stock of capital decrease too. But, the eect on aggregate employment is a priori
ambiguous given that H decreases and  n increases. To show that the eect on aggregate
employment is actually negative, rst notice that
dlnN = dln  n + dlnH: (55)
Next, from equation (46), observe that





















Thus, aggregate employment decreases following an increase in ination.
D.3 Case where c = 0, k = 0 and h = 1
Here the rental cost of capital is not aected by ination (see equation (30)).
To understand the eect on the productivity threshold and the wage rate, combine (8)
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Hence an increase in ination decreases the productivity threshold s?.
From equation (32) it follows that the wage rate decreases too.
From (49), average output either increases or remains unchanged given that
dln  y =  [dln  s   dlns
?] (59)
and dlns?  dln  s.
34To determine the eect on average employment and capital, notice from (32) that
dlns
? = dlnw: (60)
By replacing the above equation in (6) and (7), we have
dln  n = 








dln k =  [dln  s   dlns
?] (62)
Hence, average capital increases or remains unchanged following an increase in the rate of
money growth and the impact of ination on average employment is ambiguous.
We now investigate the eect of g on H. Observe that we have from (46) that
dlnH = dlnw  
AY
w
dln  y +
AX
w







































Given dln  s  dlns?, Y  X and 1 N
 +
N(1 )
 > N, it follows the mass of incumbents
H decreases as a result of an increase in g.
































































Hence, aggregate employment decreases following an increase in g if c = 0.
Notice that, from (59) and (62), the eect on average capital and average output are
the same. Hence, to determine the eect on aggregate output and capital, it is sucient
35to know only one of the two eects given that they are the same. We choose to determine
the eect on aggregate output:
dlnY = dln  y + dlnH (64)





























Given the discussion regarding the eect of g on N, by the same arguments, it follows that
































































































?    (71)



































K = H k (75)
X = K (76)









Y = H y (79)
F The welfare cost of ination
The welfare cost associated with the monetary growth rate g is dened as
W : b U  ln b C + Aln

1   b N

= ln[(1 + W)C] + Aln(1   N): (80)
where b C and b N are consumption and time spent working in the steady-state Pareto optimal
equilibrium and C and N are consumption and time spent working in steady-state, in an















































where ^ s? and b r are, respectively, the productivity threshold and the return on capital in
the Pareto optimal equilibrium, and s? and r are the productivity threshold and the return
on capital under the alternative monetary policy rule. Finally, making use of equation (65)
to replace for the respective rates of return on capital, yields equation (35) in the paper.
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